La teoría de principal-agente en los estudios sobre ciencia y tecnología

Autores/as

  • Remo Fernández-Carro Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.3989/arbor.2009.738n1054

Palabras clave:

Teoría de principal-agente, teoría de agencia, ciencia, tecnología, sociología de la ciencia, economía de la ciencia, estudios de ciencia y tecnología, políticas públicas, políticas de ciencia, sistema de recompensas de la ciencia

Resumen


Este trabajo presenta la Teoría de Principal-Agente y la forma en que se ha establecido en los últimos años en los estudios de ciencia y tecnología. Para ello describe, primero, la propia teoría y la forma en que la han desarrollado la economía y la ciencia política. El trabajo revisa el modo en que estas disciplinas la han utilizado para explicar problemas relacionados con ciencia y tecnología o que los tocan lateralmente. Después se ocupa de las aplicaciones concretas en los llamados estudios de ciencia y tecnología. El artículo propone que la teoría se relaciona con las teorías clásicas de la disciplina, de las que a veces es sólo una formalización. Como propone, por fin, que las debilidades de la teoría se deben antes a su mal uso y a su escaso desarrollo que a sus posibilidades reales, a juzgar por su éxito en otras ciencias sociales.

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Biografía del autor/a

Remo Fernández-Carro, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

Citas

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Publicado

2009-08-30

Cómo citar

Fernández-Carro, R. (2009). La teoría de principal-agente en los estudios sobre ciencia y tecnología. Arbor, 185(738), 809–824. https://doi.org/10.3989/arbor.2009.738n1054

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