Conflicts Among Constitutional Rights and Ways to Solve Them
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.3989/arbor.2010.745n1233Keywords:
Constitutional theory, conflicts of rights, subsumptive rationality, moral particularismAbstract
This paper deals with the question of the conflict of constitutional rights which acknowledge basic rights. It is shown that there are two extreme accounts: the subsumptive approach and the particularist approach that embody two main conceptions of practical rationality. Between both approaches there is room for a range of options. Two of them are taken into account: the proportionalist approach, which conserves the scope of rights restricting their stringency, and it is argued in favour of the specificationist approach, which preserve the stringency of rights restricting their scope.
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