Moral judgements and biological boundaries: beyond the reason / emotion boundary
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.3989/arbor.2013.762n4003Keywords:
biological boundaries, moral judgments, reason, emotion, dichotomy, moralityAbstract
We build boundaries that are theoretically based on biological grounds and we derive moral judgments from them. Likewise, we take for granted that emotions such as fear, disgust or rage were the element that led us to this mistake, especially when we realise the logical inconsistency of deriving moral judgments in this way. Consequently, we often associate emotions with prejudices, beliefs or fallacies, which we ought to free ourselves from. However, emotions are not the cause of the problem. Firstly, because the classical dichotomical framework that defends the reason/emotion polarity is also questionable. Secondly, because emotions, as alarms which transmit important information, may be a key element in the discovery and overcoming of the discriminations that arise at the boundaries of dichotomies. Thus, the aim here is to analyse the relationship between these three elements: biological boundaries, moral judgments and emotions. And then toargue in favour of the links between reason and emotions as a way of surpassing the old dichotomic model, and, to conclude, I will point out some of the benefits of replacing a dualistic framework by an interactive one.
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