¿Es posible ser moralmente responsable? Notas para una nueva definición del concepto de sujeto

Vicente Raga Rosaleny

doi:10.3989/arbor.2006.i718.28

Authors

Vicente Raga Rosaleny Departament de Metafísica i Teoria del Coneixement. Universitat de València

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.3989/arbor.2006.i718.28

Keywords:

Philosophy of Action, Moral Responsibility, Agent, Compatibilism, Incompatibilism, Determinism, Free Will, Social Identity

Abstract

The Strawson´s Basic Argument is the stronger against moral responsibility in Philosophy of action. One should be responsible of his identity to be moral responsible of his actions, but then nobody could be never responsible.
In this article I criticize orthodox solutions to Strawson´s sceptical challenge and show how they share with the Argument the same theological notion of monadical agent. A new solution needs a new conception of agent..

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