Conocimiento y emoción

Authors

  • Diana H. Maffía Universidad de Buenos Aires

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.3989/arbor.2005.i716.408

Keywords:

Emotions, Epistemic values, Reason, Gender

Abstract


Emotions have traditionally been considered by philosophy, as an obstacle in the obtaining of a fiable knowledge. The lack of epistemic value given to the emotional, its passivity, and the naturalization of the sexist distribution that takes reason as a masculine quality which is opposed to emotions considered as femenine, historically prevented the access of women to science and abstract knowledge, as well as the highest levels of superior education and activities of high social responsibility. In the contemporary philosophy of knowledge, the interface between knowledge and emotion receives an intensive attention, specially from the cognitive theories. Different models of the relation between knowledge and emotion will be mentioned, emphasizing the interest of reviewing the dichotomic character of this pair of concepts.

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Published

2005-12-30

How to Cite

Maffía, D. H. (2005). Conocimiento y emoción. Arbor, 181(716), 515–521. https://doi.org/10.3989/arbor.2005.i716.408

Issue

Section

Articles