A logico-gradualist approach to bioethics
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.3989/arbor.2013.762n4004Keywords:
Bioethics, gradualism, bivalence, fuzzy logicAbstract
Almost any property or state of things involved in the bioethical debate —as in everyday life and in most sciences— is likely to have fuzzy edges and borderline cases, lacking precise lines of demarcation, as happens in the case of euthanasia, abortion, embryonic research, hybrids, animal experimentation, etc. etc. However, there is a profound discrepancy between a continuous and gradual reality, characterised by nuances and transitions, a reality in grey, and a logic (an analysis and description of it) that is bivalent, between absolute truth and complete falsehood, in black and white or “all-or-nothing” terms. As an alternative to the ‘principle of bivalence’ that permeates the standard approach to reality in general and bioethics in particular, we maintain the ‘principle of gradualism’, which says that everything is a matter of degree and therefore a fuzzy-logic approach is an appropriate theoretical method in bioethics.
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